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CHURCH - STATE
INCURSIONS
PATRICK F. GEARY, ESQUIRE
During the course of the next two days, you are going to hear a series
of speeches, each devoted to some specific problem facing the Church in
America today. The common thread which runs through these speeches is
that each deals with government regulation of a Church activity.
We come to these discussions, not with the purpose of fostering some
narrow sectarian interest, but rather with the hope that by studying these
individual problems in their particular dimension, we shall be more richly
informed as to the state of the present relationship between church and
state, particularly between the Church and the Federal Government.
I have been charged with the responsibility to set before you at the
outset a perspective, a framework from which to stand during these dis-
cussions. It goes without saying that present difficulties, present problems
did not arise overnight. Rather, these problems that confront the Church
are the product of very substantial and deep-seated historical movements
within the United States. These basic moving forces are not likely to alter
in our lifetime. There has been, and there continues to be, significant
pressure upon government to expand social control over the various
meaningful entities and activities within our society. This pressure is felt
most acutely by the administrative and legislative branches of govern-
ment. The movements which have generated this pressure have their
roots in the 19th century and have grown both in magnitude and inten-
sity during the past 15 years.
There has been, and there continues to be, a felt necessity upon gov-
ernment to produce a society where important activities can be made so-
cially responsive. This is accomplished through expansion of the demo-
cratic institutions. Activities which formerly were wholly within the
private sector become socially responsible by being taken into the public
sector. This process commonly goes by the name of socialization. It is not
my object here to argue whether this is a good or bad process. I only put
to you the reality that this process exists, that it is ongoing, that it has
been ongoing, and, as far as we can determine, likely to continue. More-
over, it is our task as attorneys to deal with it successfully.
As government seeks to expand its activities into more and more
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areas of economic and social life in the nation, there is an increasing fre-
quency for government to encounter institutions maintained by religious
organizations and to inquire why those institutions should be treated dif-
ferently from similar nonsectarian institutions. More and more we find
the question being asked by government, more particularly the legislative
and administrative branches: Why should a religious hospital be treated
differently from a hospital owned by the state or by some nonsectarian
group? Why should an orphanage run by a church be treated differently
from an orphanage run by the state? Why should corporations designed
to carry out social welfare functions be treated differently from state
agencies designed to do the same task? Why should health, education and
welfare institutions operated by churches be treated differently from
health, education and welfare institutions operated by nonsectarian insti-
tutions or by the state itself?
Many individuals in government fail to see any distinction between a
church-owned charitable entity and a nonsectarian entity established os-
tensibly for the same purpose. In essence, of course, these institutions are
not established for the same purposes. The Church has and continues to
make the distinction that activities which are carried out in its name are
more readily classifiable as charitable and, although operated within the
routine channels of charitable activity, are nevertheless different because
they are part of its religious mission. The Roman Catholic Church has
steadfastly recognized itself as being different from nonsectarian
institutions.
Given the secular climate in which we live, the justification for such a
distinction is not readily apparent to many of those in public life. The
churches, on the other hand, greet equal treatment as an infringement on
free exercise of first amendment rights. The churches argue that the work
they carry on which is similar to that carried on by the nonsectarian in-
terests, is ultimately, fundamentally, and qualitatively different because
it is religiously grounded, and is, in fact, a working out of their mission to
the world. Furthermore, the churches argue that the various components
which are engaged in this activity are fundamentally part of the institu-
tion itself.
Juxtaposed to, and to a degree set over and against, the thrust of
expanding social responsibility manifested in the administrative and leg-
islative branches of government is the thrust of the judicial interpretation
of the first amendment. By and large, the judiciary has sought to keep
religion in the private sector. Thus, the judiciary on the one hand has
sought to keep the Church in the private sector, while the administrative
and legislative branches of government, particularly the Federal Govern-
ment, have been busy attempting to drag the Church activities into the
public sector. There is obviously a very real tension between these two
entirely different thrusts. If one were to describe society as a circle and
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place within that circle government in the form of another smaller circle,
the Church would lie in that area between the two circles. As government
expands, the Church is pushed evermore to the fringes of that society.
Both of these phenomena, that is, the thrust of the judiciary in keeping
religious bodies within the private sector, and the increasing regulation of
Church activities by the legislative and administrative branches of gov-
ernment, are significant in that they have their products and develop-
ments of historical movement.
I do not see any change in either direction in the near future. It
seems to me that the legislatures are likely to continue to seek ways to
influence and regulate the activities the churches are involved in. And I
do not see the judiciary changing its mind with respect to its adjudica-
tions of the establishment and free exercise clauses. Nevertheless, we are
not at the present time in a crisis. We are not at the present time over-
whelmed beyond hope. We are not at the present time on the brink of
disaster. We are, however, faced with a very serious problem. These two
phenomena, one pushing the Church in one direction and-the other push-
ing the Church in quite a different direction are not going to cease in the
near future. If they both proceed at the same pace, we will eventually
come to a very real crisis.
So my point today is first one of recognition that the problem in-
volved here represents a serious long-term difficulty. I should temper
these remarks with the observation that the recent decision in NLRB v.
Catholic Bishop of Chicago' may offer some hope that these diverse pres-
sures may be relieved. If, in fact, the Court requires legislative and ad-
ministrative branches to expressly cover churches in their programs, it
seems clear that such a requirement will have a net effect of slowing down
the legislative process and tend to leave the Church in the private sector
more often than not. Thus, if the Court continues this line of develop-
ment perhaps the collision course can be avoided.
One should point out, however, that the fundamental question in-
volved here, which is the limit of government regulation on the one hand,
and the proper role of churches in our civil society on the other, still re-
mains to be resolved in its constitutional dimension. As a matter of fact,
it can well be said that the decision in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi-
cago is a monument to the difficulty of resolving the constitutional issues
since in a sense, the Court avoided doing so.
I think that one of the things that we should turn our attention to is
the fact that the difficulties which face churches today flow from a histor-
ical context and in that respect we should remember that the Constitu-
tion is essentially an enlightenment document. As Mr. Henry Steele Com-
440 U.S. 490 (1979).
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mager, a noted U.S. historian, has recently reminded us, the Constitution
was written by a group of men committed to the enlightenment philoso-
phy, and is a document which has its root and spirit firmly grounded in
18th century America. One of the most important characteristics of the
world view which obtained during that period is to be found in the image
of the machine. The possibilities of mechanics were seen as unlimited.
The 18th century mind grasped the implications of Newtonian physics
and was rich in the symbolism of the cosmos as a machine.
We cannot overlook the mechanistic structure which girds the U.S.
Constitution itself. The system of checks and balances was designed to
operate as a machine to produce a happy equilibrium which would in turn
permit a vigorous people to exploit the economic resources of their rich
country. The U.S. Constitution was envisaged as a machine to drive a
commercial enterprise. America was for its founders, first, foremost and
above all a commercial republic. The commercial republic in its relation-
ship with religion was, in turn, grounded in the notion that there were
separate and legitimate fields of activity over which both government and
religion would have exclusive control. Moreover, the expected movement
and interplay between religion and government was to be controlled by
government.
The two religion clauses in a sense parallel the system of checks and
balances and the object of this latter system was to effect a smooth run-
ning of the civic machinery. Interplay between government and religion
would run on the gears of the religion clauses, and indeed, for over a hun-
dred years until the problem with the Mormons, the system ran very
nicely.
One of the key features for the well-being of the commercial republic
was that disquieting influences be avoided. And to this extent one must
not forget the attitudes of the philosophs toward religion. That attitude
was grounded in the belief that religion was nothing but mere supersti-
tion perpetuated by a class of clerics scheming to preserve their own place
in society. Under the enlightenment view, the ignorance and superstition
of religion were seen to be responsible for great civil destruction and civil
war, with sectarian strife being ultimately destructive of the good order of
society.
During the past 30 years American historians have nearly debunked
the enlightenment view of religion. In fact, Commager's historical scholar-
ship of the moment stresses the view that the enlightenment view of the
Age of Reason with respect to religion was itself unreasonable, full of
mean spirit, and invective. Despite this revisionism in the historical
world, it remains true that sectarian strife was greatly feared by the
Framers, if for no other reason than it might inhibit the development of
the commercial republic which they envisioned.
It is true, I believe, that this fear of sectarian strife has largely condi-
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tioned the American republic's attitude toward the presence of religion in
American society. Moreover, it has conditioned the view of the relation-
ship between church and state. One need not ldok far to find an example
of the reality and indeed the impact of this view. The concurring opinion
of Justice Harlan in Walz v. Tax Commission' is most instructive in this
regard. Justice Harlan can by no means be described as a man full of
anti-religious passion. Rather, both his work and his reputation marked
him as a man of sincerity and intelligence, a judicial officer beyond re-
pute. Nevertheless, let's listen for a moment to the fears that he ex-
presses. He began his concurrence by stating that the religion clauses are
best served by looking toward the purpose which they were designed to
fulfill. As he stated: "What is at stake as a matter of policy is preventing
that kind and degree of government involvement in religious life that his-
tory teaches us is apt to lead to strife and frequently strain a political
system to the breaking point." He further stated: "[R]eligious groups in-
evitably represent certain points of view and not infrequently assert them
in the political arena, as evidenced by the continuing debate regarding
birth control and the abortion laws. Yet history cautions that political
fragmentation on sectarian lines must be guarded against.'
Thus it seems clear that the present problems to be discussed here
during the next two days are symptomatic of some fundamental problems
which flow from the nature of the religion clauses. Moreover, while it is
true that each of these problems has its own internal tensions, which are
going to be explored by the speakers to follow, it is also true that they
represent a kind of a problem which has a much deeper and more signifi-
cant wellspring.
The journey toward defining the proper relationship between church
and state must begin with the recognition of the conceptual difficulties
inherent in the religion clauses. First, we must recognize that the Fram-
ers' viewpoint was premised in the static condition of society. The ma-
chine that they fashioned presumed that the various parts would stay in
the same relationship to one another. As a matter of fact, during the first
150 years of our national existence the various parts of the machine did
by and large remain in the same relationship one to the other. Since
World War II, however, there has been a major metamorphosis, if you
will, of the various parts of American society. We now realize that society
is not a machine but rather an organism subject to growth and develop-
ment. Today, government does not exist in the limited manner envisioned
in the 18th century by the Framers. America has, in a sense, ceased to be
the commercial republic envisioned by the founding fathers. We live to-
2 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
3 Id. at 694 (Harlan, J., concurring).
4 Id. at 695 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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day with a government that has been described by Professor Tribe, for
instance, as an affirmative state. Despite this shift in the nature of Ameri-
can government, there still remains the presumption that the relationship
between church and state remains in the same mold that the 18th century
Framers of the Constitution set up.
Secondly, I think we must recognize that as an 18th century docu-
ment the Constitution is grounded in a conception of the nature of reli-
gious experience that is really not valid. The machine of the religion
clauses was grounded in the separation of the sacred from the profane.
But, in reality, there is no distinction between religious experience and
the other. While it is common for us to speak of the religious life, political
life, economic life, social life, a life of the mind, or biologic life, there is in
reality only one life. Human beings have a multiplicity of levels of activity
and it is quite simply one of the mysteries of human life that these levels
are all meshed together. There are no neat compartments in which eco-
nomic life can be separated away from political life, or social life, or intel-
lectual life. These human systems must all go forward simultaneously.
Thus, there is ultimately a necessary interaction between civil life and
religious life. While it is true that there are different kinds of activities,
the actor, the human person, remains central. It is useless, a lesson social-
ism teaches us, to speak of distinctions between civic life and private life
since government is ultimately government of men. It is, in fact, an or-
ganization of humans. So this reality is always present; government must
always deal with this multiplicity of human activities.
The smaller the role government plays in societal life, however, the
fewer will be its contacts with this multiplicity. Of course, the greater the
role government plays in society, the more it confronts this reality. This
is, in fact, the source of the "incursions" which now confront the
churches. The numerous confrontations with religion have increased since
World War II in direct proportion to the government's increasing role in
society.
A third key element which we must recognize is that the fear of sec-
tarian strife has been a paralyzing influence on the development of the
church-state relationship. The Framers felt that there must be separate
spheres of activity for government and religion because of the potential
for sectarian strife. For too long, we have been reacting as a people to this
phantom of fear. Ironically, the philosophs themselves made much sport
of jousting with people over their imaginary fears.
Let's draw back for a moment and look at some of the realities of
American civic life. In theory, the American republic is a democracy. It
operates on the premise that its democratic institutions are to be ulti-
mately and fundamentally responsible to those who live their lives under
that government. The emergence of political parties in American history
was not an accident. It was, in fact, a product of the institutional causal-
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ity of the democratic process itself. Conflict is central to democracy. In a
certain sense, it can be said that a democratic system anticipates, and in
fact is itself sort of a Hegelian dialectic in its premise that the class of
viewpoints ultimately produces a workable synthesis.
If one looks at American constitutional law as related to free speech,
one sees the mirror of the fundamental importance of ideologic conflict in
our society. Ideologic conflict is healthy and important to a vibrant demo-
cratic government. The role of churches in our society is not an easy one
to define. As the impulse toward social control moves the gyre of govern-
ment activity ever wider and wider, the values which are uniquely in-
formed by the religious experience come evermore into the public sector.
Churches have a valuable and important role to play in American society.
They must not be deterred by fear from making such a contribution.
Justice Powell's remarks in Wolman v. Walter,5 the Ohio school case,
are indicative of a growing awareness among many in public life that the
great fear of the Framers with respect to sectarian strife may have little
real relevance to 20th century America.
Finally, I suggest we must recognize that American society is, after
all, not a machine, but an organism which has potential to grow and de-
velop. The roles of government and church are not static, but rather dy-
namic. This dynamism must inevitably be informed at some level by the
religious experience which is common to all men.
The question is not one of how to keep the church and state sepa-
rate. Rather, the question is: "How do we insure that this dynamism will
be positive, and that the interaction between church and state produc-
tive?" I think the key to this lies in recognition of the fact that this dyna-
mism will only function well if both church and government can make
mature contributions. Churches must be allowed the autonomy necessary
to be themselves. If churches simply allow themselves to be molded by
the needs of government, then there can be no mature interaction be-
tween church and government. Government needs church to be church in
the fullest sense. The dialectic process requires that both of these entities
be themselves before a meaningful interaction can take place. We are dis-
turbed about church-state incursions not because they impinge upon nar-
row sectarian interests but rather because they frustrate the Church's
growth in understanding of itself, which necessarily and ultimately frus-
trates a fruitful intercourse with government.
Thank you.
6 433 U.S. 229, 263 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
